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Abstract
The Kimberly ultramarathon was a tragic incident in which a bushfire trapped and severely injured fiveathletes. 
Rasmussen’s[1]risk management framework and accompanying Accimap method have been shown to be appropriate for 
understanding adverse events in a range of areas, including outdoor recreation[2, 3]. This paper presents an Accimap analysis of 
the Kimberly ultramarathon incident, which in turn is used to examine whether Rasmussen’s framework is appropriate in the 
extreme sports event context.  The analysis shows that features of theultramarathon incidentare consistent with 
Rasmussen’s[1]model ofaccident causation in sociotechnical systems. The incident was caused by multiple, interacting factors
across the wider sporting event system.Moreover, the characteristics of the incident were found to map onto the key tenets of 
accident causation described by Rasmussen.  This article demonstrates that systemsaccident analysis methods are appropriate for 
examining extreme sporting event incidents. Specifically, the Accimap demonstrates the systems approach provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of the causal relationships between factors involved in the Kimberly ultramarathon fire. The 
implications for the design and delivery of extremesports events are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Extreme sports events have a large following of willing competitors who seek ways of testing their skills and 
abilities in extraordinary situations [4].The requirement for competitors to complete waivers and self-assessments of 
ability are common risk management strategies [5]. When incidents occur inextreme sports events, afailure to 
understand and appreciate the risks is often seen as the principle cause [6]. Risk management for such events is an 
emerging area [7-9], and incorporatesmany stakeholders including volunteers, community organisations, spectators, 
local councils and government agencies. Athletic competitors are only one actor in a large group of stakeholders. 
There is a paucity of incident data for extreme sports events but recent high profile incidents such as the 
drowning in a; 10kmmarathon swimheld in the United Arab Emirates[10], an Ultratriathlon fatality on the Sunshine
Coast, Australia[11]and an Ultramarathon fatality in Arizona, USA[12]indicate that there is a significant problem. 
As is the case in many other safety-critical domains, when incidents occur typically there is a desire to ‘hunt for the 
broken component’[13]. This approach limits the potential to solve problems holistically, focusing on individual 
weaknesses within the system (e.g. athletes, environment, and equipment) thus making resolution of system wide 
issues difficult. 
It is argued in this paper that a systems approach is required to understand adverse events during extreme sports 
events. This approach has proven successful in other safety critical systems, including the related areas of led 
outdoor activities [2, 3, 14, 15] and disaster response [16]. The extensive inquiry into the Kimberly ultramarathon 
fire provides an opportunity to apply and test a systems approach to understanding accident causation in extreme 
sports events. The aim of this paper is to analyse the inquiry report findings [14] using the Accimap method, and 
construct a network representation of the contributory factors underpinning the incident. 
2. A systems approach to extreme sports incidents
2.1. The systems approach
The systems approach is underpinned by the idea that safety is an emergent property of sociotechnical systems. 
Interactions within the system are non-linear and produce emergent behaviors that are hard to predict[1]. 
Rasmussen’s[1] risk management framework describes various systems levels including: government; regulators;
company management; staff; and work. According to Rasmussen, each level is involved in the management and 
performance of the system. The system requires “vertical integration” to maintain control of hazardous processes
and create safe performance.Thatis, decisions made at the higher levels need to be filtered down to the lower 
levelsand influence practice, and equally feedback from the lower levels needs to filter up and inform the decisions 
and actions occurring within the higher levels of the system [17].
2.2. Accimap
The Accimap method was developed as a technique for depicting the causal flow of accidents in line with 
Rasmussen’s risk management framework. Accimapenables analysts to produce a graphical representation of the
decisions and actions involved in producing the system in which an incident has occurred [1]. The method typically
focuses on six organizational levels (although these can be modified based on the system under analysis): 
government policy and budgeting; regulatory bodies and associations; local area government planning and 
budgeting; company management; technical and operational management; physical processes and actor activities; 
and equipment and surroundings. Contributory factors at each of the levels are identified and linked between and 
across levels based on cause and effect relationships.  
2.3. The Kimberly ultramarathon
The following incident description is adapted from the inquiry report into the Kimberly ultra-marathon fire[18]. 
The Kimberly ultramarathon covered a distance of over 100kms, in one of the most remote and rugged regions of 
Australia, with 41 competitors from over 8 countries. The Kimberly region in Western Australia consists of largely 
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uninhabited steep mountain ranges cut through with sandstone and limestone gorges. The event route covered a
range of terrain, andwasmarked by several staffed checkpoints at varying distances across the route. Prior to the 
event, spot fires had been burning in and around the course route, destroying race markers. The event proceeded as 
expected until the fire changed direction. The fire rapidly encroached on the course route at the most isolated point 
of the race, accessible only on foot or by air. When staff tried to notify checkpoints of the fire, they became aware 
their communication had limited reception in this area. They were consequently unable to stop competitors running
toward the fire. Thirteencompetitors were confronted by alarge bush fire, five were unable to escape and became 
trapped in agorge and suffered severe burns. The Kimberly Ultramarathon inquiry report identified various issues 
prior to and during the incidentthese include: communication breakdowns; lack of risk identification and preparation 
for the event; and the absence of interactions between the event organiserand relevant authorities.
2.4. Methodology
The lead author identified the actions, decisions and interactions leading up to, during, and immediately 
following the Kimberly Ultramarathon incident from the legislative assembly inquiry report[18]. These factors and 
the relationships between them were then represented on the Accimap framework. To ensure accuracy, the second 
and third authors, who both have significant experience in accident analysis methods in various domains 
(e.g.aviation, led outdoor activities, disaster response) reviewed the Accimap.  Any discrepancies or disagreements 
were resolved through discussions between the authors until consensus was met.
3. Results
The Accimap is presented in Fig.1. The following description of the factors within the Accimap is based on the
information identified from inquiry report into the Kimberly Ultramarathon fire[18] .
3.1. Equipment and surroundings 
Various factors identified in the inquiry report are placed at the equipment and surroundings level. Most are 
related to the presence of the bushfire itself and the location of the race in an extremely remote setting in the 
Kimberly region; the communications equipment used was also important. 
In the days leading up to the race, various environmental and equipment issues impacted the preparation for the 
event.  The Shire of Wyndham East Kimberly (SWEK) covers an area of 121, 000 square kilometers. The marathon 
course route was set through a portion of this shire and included various types of land ownership including pastoral 
leases, Department of Environment reserves and unallocated crown land, which played a role in environmental 
factors on the day of the race. Previously this region had experienced a record-breaking rainfall and a mild fire 
season. This resulted in ahigh fuel loading across the district. The region had become more fire prone and spot fires 
had increased in number[18], damaging many ofthe race markers. Race markers delineate the path between 
checkpoints and provide direction for competitors during the race. On the day of the race other spot fires damaged 
10-12 markers between Checkpoint One and Two[18]. In replacing the markers, the event organiserbecame aware of 
the fires in and around the vicinity of the course route.
The communications equipment used was an important factor throughout the incident. The terrain and 
surrounding environment made communication devices ineffective. The remoteness and terrain of the Tier Gorge, 
obstructed communication particularly for Checkpoint Two and the section of the course known as “The Barrels”. 
Prior to the incident event staff at “The Barrels” tried to contact checkpoint two, to inform them of smoke and fire 
encroaching the course. This communication failed as the satellite phone was not equipped to work in this 
region[18]. 
Once competitors were in the Tier Gorge section, between Checkpoint Two and “The Barrels”, their capacity to 
escape the fire was limited. Tall grasses fuelled the fire and sloping gorge walls channeled the wind, increasingthe 
fires speed and ferocity[18]. When the event organiserwas made aware of the situation, the inquiry report found that 
their contact with Emergency Services was disordered andtheir communication was patchy because of the poor
1135 Eryn Grant et al. /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  1132 – 1139 
reception[18]. This lead to several miscommunications between Emergency Services and the event organiser.As a 
result, the inquiry report argues that the severity of the incident was not understood by the Fire and Emergency 
Services Authority (FESA) and St John Ambulance[18].The St John Ambulance service attended the scene, while 
FESA did not. Upon arrival the St John Ambulancecrew could not gain access to the sitedue to the terrain[18]. By 
this time, the injuries had significantly worsened for two of the competitors. The only way out was through air 
evacuation.
Issues with the evacuation equipment, which impacted the response time to aid the injured competitors, are also 
placed at this level.  The event organiser had prearranged to borrow a helicopter from an interstate film company 
(who were making a documentary of the event)in the event of an emergency[18]. They had not commissioned their 
own helicopter for the event. The helicopter was not equipped with medical suppliesnor was it capable of landing in 
the difficult terrain as it was underpowered for the maneuvers required in the rescue. Subsequently,several trips were 
required to evacuate those injured, which caused delays in medical treatment[18]. 
3.2. Physical processes and actor activities
This level focuses primarily on activities ‘on the ground’ leading up to, andduring the incident by the event 
organiser, local residents, competitors and emergency services operators. In February 2011,7 months prior to the 
event and in the middle of the wet season, one staff member from the event organiser conducted an on-site review of 
the course route[18]. The ultramarathon was held in September towards the end of the dry season. The conditions 
had changed significantly and the event organiser was not fully aware of the dangers these conditions posed[18].The 
inquiry found that the event organiser lacked knowledge of the environment in particular the impact and occurrence 
of fires.In the mostly unpopulated region of the Kimberly, it is usual for fires to burn unchecked[18]. In the days 
leading up to the event,the event organizerbecame aware of spot fires around the course as several race markerswere 
destroyed. They also experienced the fires first hand on a “fly over” of the course by a local community member, 
which involved flying over the course route in a gyrocopter. This community member emailed the president ofthe 
Shire of Wyndham East Kimberly providing information about the fires’severity and the potential for the fires to 
encroach on the course and cancel the ultramarathon[18]. However, the president ofthe Shire of Wyndham East 
Kimberly did not receive thisemail because of an inoperative computer, and the fires remained unchecked[18]. 
While event staff were aware of the fires, their main concern was the danger that missing markers posed for 
competitors losing their way on the course. According to the inquiry, they did not fully comprehend the fires as an 
injury risk to competitors[18]. Moreover, the event staff lacked fire awareness and regional knowledge, which made 
their response to the fire on the day ineffective and disorganized; they were unable to effectively communicate the 
severity and locations of the fires to other event staff and emergency services[18]. 
Immediately prior to the race, the pre-race briefing given by the event organizercontained insufficient warnings 
of the fires that were around the course. No procedures or instructions were given to competitors on what to do if 
they came in contact with a fire. Rather, competitors were made aware of the fires and told to be careful[18]. 
3.3. Technical and operational management
The technical and operational management level primarily deals with the management of the event by the event 
organiser and the management of the interactions between the event organizer and emergency services and 
government agencies. Little or no fire suppression activities had taken place because of the remoteness of the 
area[18]. The fire severity warning set by Fire and Emergency Services Authority, which were low,were not fully 
applicable to the area because it included remote areas of the Kimberly region.
The event organiser had made contact with some of the relevant government agencies prior to the race.  They 
made an official request to the Department of Health and also with Shire of Wyndham East Kimberly. These 
communications were an opportunity for both government agencies to inspect the event’s risk management plan for 
the event, although the inquiry states that this does not appear to have happened[18]. The lack of communication 
between the event organiser and the agencies was multidirectional and resulted in a fundamental breakdown at this 
level.Prior to the event, there was confusion over the roles and responsibilities of the parties involved,the event 
organiser,Fire and Emergency Services Authority, The Shire of Wyndham East Kimberly,Western Australia 
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Tourism (Eventscorp) and the Department of Regional Development and Lands (DRDL).  At the time of the 
Kimberly Ultramarathon there were no statutory adventure activity standards to guide interactions between these 
parties[18]. Partially as a result, little notice was given by the event organiser about the ultramarathonto the other 
parties involved, and little was requested in return. Eventscorp and the Shire of Wyndham East Kimberly did not 
read the risk management plan provided by the event organizer and Fire and Emergency Services Authority were 
not provided with course route locations and maps. The Department of Regional Development and Lands did not 
ask the event organizerto apply for permissions to run the marathon through pastoral leases, which would have been 
the normal procedure [18].
The Fire and Emergency Services Authority Communication Centre typically plays a key role in disseminating 
information to regional Fire and Emergency Services Authority offices. However, at the time of the incident, they 
did not alert regional officers[18]. This lead to a delay in the response, as the regional office did not prepare rescue 
resources to attend the scene. In addition, theFire and Emergency Services Authority Communication Centre did not 
follow the correct procedure for emergency calls. The event organizer was told to hang up from Fire and Emergency 
Services Authority Communication Centre and call the primary national emergency number in Australia (000)[18]. 
Because of their persistent communication issues, there was a delay inthe event organisercontacting 000.  This 
resulted in a delayed emergency response.
3.4. Local area government, company management and budgeting
This level captures decisions and actions at a strategic level for the event organiser’s planning of the event and 
also interactions with local government agencies. The event organizerdid not consult with local expert bodies or 
local government agenciesregarding their risk management and evacuation plan[18]. In evacuating the injured 
competitors the event organizer did not follow their own evacuation procedure and did not obtain an emergency 
helicopter [18]. In addition, the decision to cancel the race came extremely late, well after the incident occurred, 
leaving the potential for more competitors to be injured[18]. 
3.5. Regulatory bodies and associations
Prior to the Kimberly Ultramarathon, Adventure Activity Standards (AAS) existed for 16 outdoor adventure 
activities to be staged as events; however, marathon and footraces were not covered under these standards[18]. All 
stakeholders involved in the Kimberly Ultramarathon including the event organizer, government agencies and the 
competitors had no standards to underpin the interactions, decisions and responses in regards to the Kimberly 
Ultramarathon.
3.6. Government policy and budgeting
At the government policy and budgeting level, decisions and actions made by government departments which 
contributed to the decisions, planning and responses at the lower levels.  In January 2011, the event organiser 
contacted the Western Australian Department of Health (DoH) with an official request to engage overseas doctors 
for the event; Western Australian Department of Health approved this request[18]. In addition, Western Australian 
Department of Health were familiar with the event organiser from the 2010 ultramarathon event, after which serious 
concerns had been raised about competitors’ health and safety[18].
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Fig.1.Kimberly Ultramarathon Accimap.
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They flagged this concern with multiple agencies in February, 7 months prior to the event at a health services 
subcommittee meeting where Fire and Emergency Services Authority and St John Ambulance were both 
present[18]. The Department of Healthdid not follow up on these discussions, despite their concerns from the 
previous year [18]. Days prior to the event, the Fire and Emergency Services Authority did not make contact with 
the event organizer, despite being made aware that the event organizer were seeking advice on the spot fires in and 
around the course route[18]. As a result, the Fire and Emergency Services Authoritydid not provide the event 
organizer with information about the fires.
In July 2011 it was agreed by the Western Australian Tourism board they would sponsor the Kimberly Ultra 
Marathon[18]. Partial payment would be supplied to the event organizer by Western Australian Tourism 
(Eventscorp) based on supply of their risk management plan for the event, which they did[18]. However, according 
to the inquiry report,Eventscorpdid not properly assess the document.The Department of Regional and Development 
Land (DRDL) were also involved in the sponsorship agreement[18]. They were aware that the course route was 
planned through pastoral leases and should have sought permissions for the event organiser for use of this land[18].  
In addition, the Shire of Wyndham East Kimberly was provided the risk management plan when the event organiser
applied to use public parks for their finish line, however the plan was not read prior to the event[18]. 
4. Discussion
The aim of this article was to test whether Rasmussen’s Accimap technique [1]is a suitable approach for 
examining adverse events that occur duringextreme sports events. Accimap was used to represent the contributing
factors, and interactions,that were identified in the inquiry into the Kimberly Ultramarathon incident. The case 
study demonstrates that Accimapwas useful in this context, providing a holistic output to represent all levels of the 
system and the wider system failures. In particular, the following findings suggest that Rasmussen’s risk 
management framework and Accimap method are suited to this domain:
x the contributory factors identified in the inquiry report reside across the six levels of Rasmussen’s framework and 
Accimap method;
x the contributory factors identified are related to multiple actors, organisation, and artefacts within the adventure 
activity system;
x relationships were found between the contributory factors, both within the six system levels and across the six 
levels; and
x interactions between the contributory factors led to emergent behaviors that played a key role in the incident.
It is concluded then that the Accimap presented provides a rich explanation of the Kimberly ultramarathon 
incident that is consistent with contemporary models of accident causation. In addition, it is concluded that Accimap 
provides a suitable approach for examining adverse events in this domain. Applying Accimap enables an 
understanding beyond the local factors occurring at the ‘sharp end’ of the system[13, 19]. The Accimap 
demonstrates that a complex web of factors contributed to the tragedy. The hunt for the broken component [13]could 
focus on the event organizer’s lack of contact with authorities and preparation for the event, however, that would 
ignore several critical features including government agencies interactions and emergency services response.
The analysis shows higher-level factors played a contributory role in decisions and actions at the lower-levels of 
the system leading up to and during the incident. For example, government agencies inefficiency in following 
procedures in regard to the event organiser’s risk management plan; lack of interaction between Fire and Emergency 
Services Authority and the event organiser prior to the event, lack of preparedness of emergency resources from a
government level; and the absence of adventure activity standards for marathon events that ought to underpin all 
interactions. Overall this suggests that a greater understanding of higher-level relationships contribution to a better 
understanding of system wide failures.
The Accimap of the Kimberly ultramarathon fire has identified multiple factors at all six levels of the system and 
discussed the causal relationships between them. Placing blame on the broken components in the Kimberly 
Ultramarathon fire means systematic failures will remain into the future. 
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5. Conclusion 
The anaylsis presented demonstrates that systemic accident causation methods can be sucessfully applied to 
incidents that occur in the extreme sports event domain. In our view this provides a compelling opportunity to 
understand and enhance safety in this domain, and further research is required.In particular, the data systems 
required to support systems analyses of incidents, minor and major, appear to provide the first steps in a research 
agenda around safety and accident analysis. With risk assessments regularly idenified as inadequate, it is argued that 
a new systems perspective is required to for understanding and enhancing decisions, interactions and  responses in 
regard to to all actors across all levels of extreme sports events. 
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